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Preface 
 
This thesis follows a career that has focussed on working with high consequence 
pathogens.  I started as a research analytical technician working with Salmonella 
bacteriophages, advancing as a research scientist working on Escherichia coli 
serotype O157 (MPhil thesis, 1996), then joined the Special Pathogens Reference 
Unit as a Senior Project Team Leader taking responsibility for the Anthrax 
Reference Unit.  I subsequently led the response at Porton to the Foot and Mouth 
Disease Virus crisis in the UK, and then swiftly back to the Anthrax Reference Unit 
to co-ordinate the response to the Anthrax releases in the United States of America 
and the subsequent knock-on to the United Kingdom.  My successful navigation of 
these challenges highlighted my capability in this area and resulted in the 
opportunity to take on the challenge of a previously poorly managed US contracts 
team of scientists and technicians, that at its peak grew to employing 40+ staff, 
fourteen projects and funding of over $59M.  This wealth of experience has placed 
me in the unique position of being able to lead the research, clinical and service 
delivery teams working at the maximum levels of containment for human and 
animal pathogens. 
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Abstract 
 
This thesis outlines the classification of biological agents, the regulatory framework 
for working safely and the security implications of handling high consequence 
pathogens followed by a detailing of my significant contributions to this field.   
 
My work covers a broad range of pathogens and research questions, yet shares a 
common theme of developing novel approaches to working in containment: 
examining the use of bacteriophage as a mechanism for the capture and detection 
of Escherichia coli serotyope O157; characterisation  of the anthrax vaccine and its 
production processes, to inform the understanding and development of current and 
next generation vaccines; an analysis of environmental anthrax spore levels and 
their decontamination, contributing to responses in the event of a bioterrorism 
event; improvements to established but unreliable inactivation methods, thereby 
allowing viral haemorrhagic fever samples to be taken out of containment whilst 
maintaining the integrity of molecular material; and innovative approaches to 
working safely and humanely with a primate model of monkeypox virus has been 
instrumental in the approval of a new vaccine for smallpox. 
 
This work catalogues my advancement through the containment levels at Public 
Health England, which has culminated in my current senior management role as 
the Head of High Containment Microbiology, with responsibility for the ACDP 
Containment Level 4 in-vitro facilities at Porton and Colindale. 
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1.  Commentary  
     Approaches to Handling High Consequence Pathogens 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
1.1.1. ACDP and SAPO Classification of Biological Agents 
 
The UK has two classification schemes for pathogens: the Advisory Committee on 
Dangerous Pathogens (ACDP) (HSE, 2005) which covers the control and 
classification of human pathogens, and the Specified Animal Pathogens Order 
(SAPO) (HSE, 2015) which covers the control and classification of animal 
pathogens.  
 
The ACDP issues guidelines (HSE, 2001, 2005, 2006) for working with pathogens 
and it has the status of guidance supporting the Health and Safety at Work Act 
1974 and the Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations (COSHH) 
(HSE, 2013b). Micro-organisms are classified into four hazard groups by the ACDP 
on the basis of pathogenicity to humans, risk to laboratory workers, transmissibility 
to the community, and whether effective prophylaxis is available (HSE, 2013a) 
(Table 1). The hazard group of the pathogen then determines the containment 
level that has to be used to undertake work with the pathogen. An ACDP hazard 
group 4 pathogen is the highest categorisation and work with this hazard group 
must be undertaken at containment level 4. The example pathogens highlighted in 
bold in Table 1 are pathogens that have been used in work described in this 
commentary. 
 
Animal pathogens are classified in a similar way to human pathogens with the 
primary focus, understandably, on the potential harm to susceptible animal species, 
the potential for the disease to spread from the laboratory and the subsequent 
economic impact if a release occurred. It is estimated that the 2007 release of Foot 
and Mouth Disease Virus from facilities in Pirbright, which affected eight farms, 
cost the government £47 million and industry £100 million (Anderson, 2008). Table 
2 describes the criteria for classification of animal pathogens into their respective 
groups (HSE, 2015). 
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Table 1: Definition of ACDP Hazard Groups. 
 
ACDP hazard 
group 
Definition Examples 
1 An organism that is most unlikely to cause human disease. 
Staphylococcus 
epidermis 
2 
An organism that may cause human 
disease and which may be a hazard to 
laboratory workers but is unlikely to 
spread to the community. Laboratory 
exposure rarely produces infection and 
effective prophylaxis or treatment is 
usually available 
Legionella 
pneumophila 
3 
An organism that may cause severe 
human disease and presents a serious 
hazard to laboratory workers. It may 
present a risk of spread to the 
community but there is usually effective 
prophylaxis or treatment available. 
Bacillus anthracis 
Escherichia coli O157 
Monkeypox virus 
4 
An organism that causes severe human 
disease and is a serious hazard to 
laboratory workers. It may present a 
high risk of spread to the community 
and there is usually no effective 
prophylaxis or treatment. 
Ebola virus 
Crimean-Congo 
haemorrhagic fever virus 
 
Table 2:  Definition of SAPO Hazard Groups 
 
SAPO hazard 
group 
Definition 
1 
Disease producing organisms which are native to animals 
in the UK (enzootic) or do not produce notifiable 
diseases. 
2 
Disease producing organisms that are either exotic or 
produce notifiable disease, but have a low risk of spread 
from the laboratory. 
3 
Disease-producing organisms which are either exotic or 
produce notifiable disease, but have a moderate risk of 
spread from the laboratory. 
4 
Disease-producing organisms which are either exotic or 
produce notifiable disease, but have a high risk of spread 
from the laboratory. 
 
Clearly, some zoonotic pathogens are both human and animal pathogens, and as 
such have dual classification e.g. Bacillus anthracis - ACDP hazard group 3, SAPO 
hazard group 3; Foot and Mouth Disease Virus – ACDP hazard group 2, SAPO 
hazard group 4; Nipah virus – ACDP hazard group 4, SAPO hazard group 4.  Both 
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ACDP and SAPO maintain lists of agents and their categorisation which are 
reviewed and updated on a regular basis.   
 
1.1.2. High Consequence Pathogens 
 
High consequence pathogens are those that are classified in the UK as belonging to 
ACDP hazard groups 3 or 4 (Table 1); they are also often termed high containment 
pathogens, and these terms will be used interchangeably throughout this 
commentary. The National Health Service High Consequence Infectious Disease 
(NHS HCID) programme defines high consequence pathogens as those that are 
responsible for infectious diseases that are characterised by: acute infectious 
illness, the ability to spread in healthcare settings, a high case fatality rate, 
difficulties in recognition and rapid detection, and often lack of effective treatment. 
Infections caused by these pathogens frequently require co-ordination at a national 
level to ensure an effective and consistent response (Pinto-Duschinsky & Jeavons, 
2015) and example of this would be the two cases of Monkeypox virus infection in 
the UK in 2018 (Vaughan et al., 2018) which was managed as an enhanced 
incident in PHE. 
 
Several high consequence pathogens are included in the Research and 
Development Blueprint List of Priority Diseases issued by the World Health 
Organisation (WHO, 2018); this list highlights those pathogens that have the 
potential to cause a public health emergency and identifies where there is a need 
for accelerated research and development. All but one of these agents are 
categorised as ACDP hazard group 3 or 4 and therefore require handling in high 
containment facilities; some of these are featured in the work described in this 
commentary. 
 
1.1.3. High Containment Facilit ies 
 
The requirements for the building, safe operation and maintenance of high 
containment facilities in the UK are based on the guidance and regulations of 
COSHH, ADCP and SAPO, and are reviewed in Table 3. Additionally, there are 
obligations under the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (ACTSA) relating 
to the access and security arrangements of high containment facilities. The 
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advanced level of engineering required to meet these containment specifications, 
and the associated management systems and emergency procedures that 
establishments housing these laboratories must have in place together result in 
high building, operation and maintenance costs for these facilities.  Consequently, 
all ACDP containment level 4 facilities in the UK are government owned and 
funded; UK facilities that can undertake work with ACDP hazard group 4 organisms 
are the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) at Porton Down (a 
Ministry of Defence facility), and the two Public Health England laboratories one at 
Porton Down, Wiltshire and the other at Colindale, North West London. 
 
While there is some overlap between ACDP and SAPO requirements for 
containment laboratories (Table 3), these differ in their primary aim; ACDP 
requirements are designed to protect the operator from risk of infection, while 
SAPO containment is designed to minimise the risk of release to the environment 
of agents that may have an economic impact. Thus, ACDP4 and SAPO4 
containment are not equivalent; SAPO containment level 4 laboratories in animal 
health laboratories (such as Animal and Plant Health Agency [APHA]) cannot be 
used for ACDP hazard group 4 pathogens, while ACDP containment level 4 facilities 
can handle the highest categorisation of both systems if they have the appropriate 
SAPO licensure. 
 
The ACDP guidelines give very clear guidance on how the laboratory should 
operate but these only apply to work involving standard microbiology methods. Any 
work that is non-standard requires further robust risk assessment and may need 
additional regulatory approval. A view will be taken on new work if it is deemed a 
significant change from previous work, even if regulatory approval to use such 
agent has been granted. A recent example of this within my department was a 
series of experiments involving infection of ticks with Crimean-Congo Haemorrhagic 
Fever (CCHF) in an ACDP Containment Level 4 in-vitro laboratory; this required 
submission of extensive risk assessments, proof of concept at ACDP Containment 
Levels 2 and 3 and a walk through of the work with HM Inspector from the HSE. 
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Table 3:  Review of ACDP, COSHH and SAPO containment measures required for 
containment facilities. 
Containment measure 
Containment Level 
2 3 4 
Workplace separated 
from other activities No Yes Yes 
Supply and Extract 
HEPA filtration No 
Single extract 
only 
Single supply, 
double extract 
Restricted access to 
authorised personnel 
only 
Yes Yes Yes 
Sealable for 
disinfection/fumigation No Yes Yes 
Negative pressure 
cascade No Yes 
Yes, specified for 
SAPO 
(-50 to -75 Pa) 
Vector control No, unless 
animal 
containment 
No, unless animal 
containment. 
Yes, if SAPO 
Yes 
Surfaces impervious to 
water and easy to 
clean 
Yes, bench Yes, bench, walls and floor 
Yes, bench, walls, 
floor and ceiling 
Safe storage of 
biological agent 
Yes, secured for 
Schedule 5 
pathogens 
Yes, secured for 
Schedule 5 
pathogens 
Yes, secured. 
Observation window 
or alternative No Yes Yes 
Laboratory has own 
equipment No 
Yes, as far as 
reasonably 
practicable 
Yes 
Infected material, 
including any animals 
to be handled in 
containment 
Yes, where 
aerosol 
Yes, where 
aerosol Yes 
Incinerator Accessible Accessible On-site 
Effluent treatment 
pant No 
Yes, where RA 
dictates Yes 
Shower on exit No No, except where RA dictates Yes, for SAPO 
Autoclave 
Yes, in the 
building Yes, within suite 
Yes, within suite, 
must be double-
ended and 
interlocked doors 
Protective clothing 
Yes Yes 
Yes, complete 
change including 
footwear 
Airlocks No No, unless RA dictates Yes 
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1.2. Scientific Contribution to the Study of High Consequence 
Pathogens 
 
A significant portion of my career has involved work with ACDP and SAPO high 
containment pathogens, both in vitro and in vivo. This commentary outlines my 
work on the culture, detection and inactivation of high containment pathogens, 
followed by a description of my considerable contributions to the study of two 
particular high containment pathogens, Bacillus anthracis and high consequence 
pox viruses.  
 
1.2.1. Pathogen Culture and Detection in ACDP CL3 and CL4 
Facilit ies 
 
My work on the detection of high containment pathogens began with the 
development of a rapid detection system for E. coli serotype O157 (Roberts, 1996). 
Briefly, bacteriophages were used to phage type isolates and a cocktail was made 
of three bacteriophages that between them covered all phage types of E. coli 
serotype O157.  These were then grown to high titre and used as an antigen 
capture for a range of sample types.  A biotinylated bacteriophage was then used 
as a detector for any E. coli serotype O157 that was captured on the plate.  This 
could confirm the presence of E. coli serotype O157 within several hours as 
opposed to conventional methods that took several days. 
 
The detection of high containment pathogens historically required containment 
facilities but with the advancement of molecular techniques, pathogen detection 
can now be carried out at lower levels of containment. ACDP Containment Level 4 
laboratories now are principally used for the culture and propagation of viruses 
from clinical samples. Inactivation of high-risk clinical samples, isolates and 
experimental samples containing HG3 and HG4 pathogens is often performed in 
containment, prior to removal of samples to allow further work to be undertaken at 
a lower containment level (see section 1.2.2). 
 
The advancements since molecular methods were developed are staggering and 
have led to an unbelievable amount of data being generated very quickly, 
particularly in the sequencing field. The 2013–2016 Ebola virus outbreak in West 
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Africa was the largest and most complex Ebola outbreak since the discovery of the 
virus in 1976; the number of cases and deaths during this outbreak were 
considerably higher than all previous known outbreaks combined. A multinational 
response was mounted to help control the outbreak, and there were several cases 
of foreign healthcare workers contracting the disease.  The UK had three imported 
cases.  My department isolated and cultured the virus from the first of these UK 
cases; the full virus sequence was rapidly deposited in Genbank for use by the 
wider research community (Bell et al., 2014).   
 
Culturing pathogens in high containment facilities can be challenging, particularly 
at ACDP containment level 4.  Compliance with the range of regulatory, safety and 
operational requirements make quite simple tasks difficult: space is limited, 
especially in cabinet-line-based laboratories; specialised equipment may not be 
available; sample manipulation using MSCIII gauntlets is difficult. Due to the 
bespoke nature of each CL4 facility, microbiological methods are hard to 
standardise between laboratories, and this has led to inconsistencies in data 
generation between groups. This problem can lead to incorrect conclusions being 
drawn about pathogen characteristics, the efficacy of therapeutic interventions, or 
the suitability of animal models being drawn The development of standardised 
methods of propagation are essential for performing reproducible experiments with 
high containment pathogens. The US contracts work undertaken under the NIAID 
program has demonstrated the problems that can be encountered if propagation is 
not standardised; the program had faced issues with US contractors using 
Burkholderia mallei (personal communication) whereby differing contractors were 
obtaining different results from performing the same animal studies.  Upon 
investigation, it was found that the challenge material was being grown in different 
ways, from different sources and different passage numbers were being used at 
each establishment. As a result, disease presentations, immunological profiles and 
progression were different at each contractor. As a result of these issues, they 
funded a repository, the Biodefense and Emerging Infections Research Resources 
Repository (BEI Resources), that supply all material required to undertake work by 
their contractors. Where possible, all pathogens are supplied in sufficient quantity 
for all work to be undertaken, for example the Monkeypox work described in 
section 1.2.4 (Tree et al., 2015, Hatch et al., 2013) and if not possible, stock 
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vials, reagents and detailed protocols are distributed with clear acceptance criteria 
to ensure consistency in all facilities. 
 
A considerable amount of recent work by my department has exploited this 
requirement for consistent pathogen propagation, and we have been successful in 
winning grants for the production of authenticated Ebola and Marburg virus stocks 
for the US Government in 2007 (NIAID, 2007), 2013 (NIAID, 2013) and, more 
recently, in 2017 (BARDA, 2017). These contracts required the production of 
authenticated master and working virus banks that will be shipped to BEI 
Resources for dissemination to contractors. This contract is a prime example of 
where standardisation is key, production of the stocks requires a number of key 
tests and one of these is the 7U/8U ratio that can change on repeated passage and 
is thought to affect the pathogenicity of the virus. It has been reported by Trefry et 
al., 2016 that independent of statistical significance amongst vaccinates, it is the 
authors’ recommendation that future challenges be carried out utilising a high 
percentage 7U Ebola virus stock in order to mitigate the risk that there is a 
difference between the two challenge stocks in the context of a vaccine. 
 
1.2.2. Inactivation Studies of High Containment Pathogens 
 
The study of high consequence pathogens, whether for fundamental research, 
development of new diagnostics, evaluation of therapeutics, or monitoring of 
clinical specimens from a confirmed patient, requires that infectious material is 
handled at the appropriate containment level; however, it is highly desirable to be 
able to work with this material at lower levels of containment for practical and 
economic reasons. Prior to its removal of material from high containment, 
infectious material must be inactivated by a method that is both validated for the 
organism in question and is compatible with procedures that will be carried out 
downstream. Failure to fully inactivate material before its removal from CL3 or CL4 
facilities represents a potentially catastrophic breach of containment, with major 
implications for the safety of operators and the wider community. Indeed, recent 
inactivation failures have caused significant concern worldwide, including two 
incidences of the removal of unsterilised anthrax samples from CL3 (Centers for 
Disease & Prevention, 2014; Sample, 2014).   
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Chaotropic salts such as guanidium isothiocyanate or guanidine hydrochloride are a 
component of the lysis buffers of several commercially available nucleic acid 
extraction kits, and as such are routinely used for RNA and DNA extraction from 
clinical samples. Blow and colleagues reported that AVL buffer, a guanidinium 
isothiocyanate-containing component of the Qiagen QIAamp Viral RNA Mini Kit 
(Qiagen, 2018), was effective at inactivating a range of different ACDP3 and ACDP4 
pathogens, including Ebola and Marburg viruses (Blow et al., 2004). These data 
have been used as evidence to support the use of AVL buffer for rendering samples 
safe so that they can be removed to lower containment levels for processing. AVL 
buffer has since been used extensively for inactivation of high risk samples; AVL 
buffer alone was relied upon for inactivation of Ebola virus clinical samples before 
removal from primary containment in a number of diagnostic laboratories during 
the 2013-2016 West African Ebola virus outbreak (Kerber et al., 2016). 
 
Concerns were raised at a Global Health Security Initiative (GHSI) meeting of the 
Laboratory Network working group (September, 2013) that nucleic acid extraction 
buffers may not be completely effective for virus inactivation which would lead to 
the assumption there were flaws in the Blow study (Blow et al., 2004), for 
example, inactivated samples were diluted out to overcome the cytotoxic effect of 
AVL, so experiment would miss low virus titres. Although the GHSI data on which 
these concerns were based remain unpublished, studies published since have 
provided evidence of incomplete Ebola virus inactivation by AVL in murine blood, 
marmoset sera and cell culture media (Haddock, Feldmann, & Feldmann, 2016; 
Smither et al., 2015). More recently, we have demonstrated incomplete inactivation 
of Ebola virus in human serum (Burton et al., 2017). Thus, there is now 
compelling evidence that AVL buffer alone cannot be guaranteed to inactivate 
Ebola virus. However, it was found that complete inactivation of Ebola virus was 
achieved following the addition of ethanol to samples in AVL buffer (Haddock et al., 
2016; Smither et al., 2015); this is the next stage of the manufacturer’s protocol 
for manual RNA extraction (Qiagen, 2018). It was therefore a recommendation of 
the GHSI that the ethanol addition step of the nucleic acid extraction procedure 
should be undertaken prior to removal of Ebola virus samples from containment. As 
the UK representative on the GHSI working group, I ensured that this 
recommendation was implemented across the High Containment Microbiology 
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Department and that local procedures for removal of high hazard material from our 
CL4 laboratories were updated accordingly. 
 
The addition of ethanol to samples before removing them from primary 
containment is possible for manual RNA extractions, but this poses problems for 
automated extraction platforms with which this is incompatible. This has particular 
implications for diagnostic laboratories, where high-throughput automated systems 
are preferable. Such automated systems were introduced into the PHE diagnostic 
laboratories in Sierra Leone during the 2013-2016 Ebola outbreak, when Qiagen 
EZ1 machines replaced manual extraction procedures. The sample workflow for 
automated extraction in these laboratories involved the removal of samples from 
primary containment following incubation with AVL and an additional heat 
inactivation step (60 °C for 15 minutes) before loading samples onto the 
automated platforms (Bailey et al., 2016). A potential issue with adopting heat 
inactivation steps in high-throughput and/or outbreak situations is that continuous 
temperature monitoring of samples is required to ensure full inactivation. To 
address this problem, we performed studies to evaluate the suitability of Triton X-
100 as a second inactivant (Burton et al., 2017). Triton X-100 is a non-
denaturing detergent that solubilises lipid membranes, and has been shown to 
reduce Ebola virus infectivity without affecting blood chemistry or downstream 
nucleic acid analysis (Lau,et al., 2015; Lewandowski et al., 2017; Tempestilli et al., 
2015). We found that the combination of both AVL buffer and 0.1% Triton X-100 
for 10 or 20 minutes completely inactivated Ebola virus in mock clinical serum 
samples, and that the treatment was compatible with downstream RT-qPCR and 
next generation sequencing (Burton et al., 2017). This represents a considerable 
improvement over heat or ethanol treatment as a second inactivation step because 
it permits consistent treatment of samples and is compatible with the automated 
extraction platforms widely used in diagnostic laboratories. These findings will be of 
great benefit to the wider diagnostic community, allowing for the development of 
standard operating procedures that permit effective downstream sample 
processing while not compromising operator safety.   
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1.2.3. Bacillus anthracis  
 
Bacillus anthracis is a gram-positive, spore-forming bacterium that causes anthrax, 
a severe infectious disease of both animals and humans. As such, it is classified 
under ACDP and SAPO and must be handled at Containment Level 3 under both 
sets of regulations. The type of anthrax infection varies according to the entry 
route of the B. anthracis spore: cutaneous anthrax is caused by spore entry 
through a skin lesion, most commonly following handling of infected animals or 
animal products; spore inhalation or ingestion (through the consumption of 
contaminated water or animal products) leads to inhalation anthrax and 
gastrointestinal anthrax respectively. Cutaneous anthrax is the most common form 
in humans, and presents as small blisters that develop into ulcers with 
characteristic black eschars. Cutaneous anthrax causes less severe disease than 
inhalation or gastrointestinal anthrax, which is associated with more systemic 
symptoms; however, all types may cause severe disease and death if left 
untreated. Anthrax cases in the UK are rare. Isolated cases of occupationally-
derived anthrax, associated with the handling of contaminated animal products 
(Anaraki et al., 2008; Pullan et al., 2015; Sharp & Roberts, 2006), and sporadic 
injection anthrax outbreaks have occurred among drug users, associated with 
contaminated heroin (Grunow et al., 2012; Sykes et al., 2013). 
 
B. anthracis spores are highly resistant to extremes of temperature and humidity, 
and to treatment with chemical disinfectants; spores can remain viable for long 
periods in soil, and B. anthracis has been recovered from contaminated soil and 
animal remains after many decades (de Vos, 1990; Wilson & Russell, 1964).  These 
properties have led to anthrax being successfully developed as an effective 
biological weapon (Jernigan et al., 2002); anthrax weaponisation has been 
achieved by at least five national bioweapons programs: in the UK, Japan, the US, 
Russia and Iraq.  
 
The vegetative form of B. anthracis produces three primary virulence factors: the 
bacterial capsule, lethal toxin (LT) and oedema toxin (ET). LT and ET are formed 
from combinations of the cell receptor component protective antigen (PA) with 
lethal factor (LF) and oedema factor (EF), respectively. LT and ET are required for 
the bacteria to evade host immunity and to enable systemic dissemination; to do 
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this, they must be internalised into the cytoplasm of host cells by endocytosis in a 
process that is mediated by PA (Friebe, van der Goot, & Burgi, 2016).  
 
An anthrax vaccine is available for humans deemed to be at high-risk of contracting 
anthrax; cell-free filtrates of the attenuated, non-capsulated Sterne strain of B. 
anthracis (Sterne, 1939) are licensed in the both the UK and US for human use 
(Turnbull, 1991). The UK vaccine is made by alum-precipitation of antigen from in 
vitro Sterne cultures and is termed anthrax vaccine precipitated (AVP), to 
distinguish it from anthrax vaccine adsorbed (AVA) which is licensed for use in the 
US. AVP has been produced at the Porton site in the UK for over 60 years 
(historically by PHE and its predecessor organisations, now by Porton Biopharma 
Limited) and in this time, there has been little change to the manufacturing 
process. B. anthracis Sterne is grown in media supplemented with casmino acids 
and activated charcoal in order to maximise the yield of PA (Belton & Strange, 
1954; Strange & Belton, 1954), which was originally thought to be the principal 
immunogen of anthrax vaccines (Turnbull, 1991). Five hundred millilitre cultures 
are grown statically in glass Thompson bottles at 37°C until the culture pH drops 
below pH 7.6, at which point cultures are harvested and the culture supernatants 
are pooled and filter-sterilised; this is followed by the addition of alum and pH 
adjustment to 5.8-6.2. The alum precipitate is allowed to settle under gravity, the 
supernatant is removed and the precipitate is resuspended in saline.  
 
Despite the demonstrable efficacy of AVP, it was poorly characterised in terms of 
the components that end up in the final product. A study I authored sought to 
address this gap in knowledge by elucidating the composition of AVP (Hallis et 
al., 2002). We used sensitive, specific immunoassays to demonstrate the 
presence of PA, LF and EF, and surface layer proteins Sap and EA1 in AVP 
preparations, and used a series of novel in vitro functional assays to demonstrate 
that PA, EF and LF in AVP retained their biological activity. These findings were 
confirmed a couple of years later in a study that used two-dimensional gel 
electrophoresis to characterise AVP (Whiting et al., 2004).  
 
The presence of LF and EF differentiates AVP from US-produced AVA, which 
contains negligible levels of LF and EF (Ivins et al., 1998; Puziss et al., 1963). The 
differing compositions of AVP and AVA contribute to distinct antibody responses 
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following vaccination, and there is considerable evidence pointing to a contributory 
role for antibodies raised against these non-PA components to the protective effect 
of AVP in animal and human studies (Baillie et al., 2003; Baillie et al., 2010; Dumas 
et al., 2017; Pezard et al., 1995; Price et al., 2001; Turnbull et al., 1986). It was a 
concern that the non-PA components of AVP may be immunomodulatory and 
negatively impact the PA-specific immune response, but the presence of these 
other vaccine components has since been shown not to adversely impact the PA-
induced protective immune response (Baillie et al., 2003). Thus, the inclusion of LF, 
EF and/or surface layer proteins, rather than solely focusing on PA as a 
component, in the next generation of anthrax vaccines may improve their 
immunogenicity.  
 
Beyond a limited study of carbohydrate metabolism and PA production during static 
culture of B. anthracis Sterne (Puziss & Wright, 1959), very little was known about 
the growth characteristics and physiology of B. anthracis Sterne strain under the 
conditions used for vaccine manufacture, despite decades of successful AVP 
production. In 2007, we published an extensive study of a range of physiological 
parameters during AVP production, including growth characteristics, utilisation of 
substrates and antigen production (Charlton et al., 2007) with the aim of 
providing a set of baseline parameters to inform both current and future vaccine 
production. Ensuring that our study accurately reflected the conditions during AVP 
manufacture required a complex study design and the use of the vaccine 
production facility, which operates at both ACDP and SAPO Containment Level 3. 
The sampling method for this study involved harvesting whole bottles at desired 
time-points instead of repeated sampling from the same bottle, since the 
disturbance of cultures is thought to affect growth and antigen production through 
disturbance of the pellicle that forms on the surface of the culture supernatant. 
This study successfully established reproducible growth and metabolism kinetics for 
B. anthracis Sterne under vaccine manufacture conditions.  
 
ELISAs were used to quantify levels of PA and LF across the culture period 
(Charlton et al., 2007). Furthermore, we  demonstrated that levels of PA and LF 
were near maximal at the time that bacterial culture is harvested during the 
vaccine manufacture process (providing assurance that current harvest times are 
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optimal) and showed that these antigens are not degraded during fermentation (as 
has been reported for other culture methods; (Farchaus et al., 1998)). 
 
The parameters established in the Charlton study (Charlton et al., 2007) have 
been used subsequently in the evaluation of miniature bioreactors for growth of B. 
anthracis (Mukhopadhyay et al., 2010; Mukhopadhyay et al., 2011); these 
miniature bioreactors have a small footprint and reduce experimental volumes used 
and are thus particularly suited to the use with ACDP hazard group 3 pathogens in 
containment, where space is at a premium and small volumes of pathogen are 
preferable in order to reduce risk to the operator. 
 
Both the Hallis and Charlton studies contribute significantly to the understanding of 
the AVP production process and the individual components that make up this 
vaccine, and inform the development of next generation anthrax vaccines. The 
assays developed in these studies facilitate the use of antigen quantification to 
provide assurance of AVP batch-to-batch consistency, and could ultimately reduce 
or replace the in vivo tests that are required currently prior to batch release.  
 
The production of authenticated, standardised B. anthracis spore batches was 
required for the delivery of two NIAID task orders that were awarded to test the 
efficacy of antibiotics in small animals (NIAID, 2003a) and the primate model 
(NIAID, 2003b).  The standard method for the production of B. anthracis spores 
was laborious; it required growing a lawn of B. anthracis on sporulation agar using 
flat bottomed glass medical flats (Turnbull, 1998), which would be left for several 
weeks before being washed off using diluent and glass beads. The sheer amount of 
spores required to undertake all the studies required of the two awarded tasks 
would have taken over twelve months. Early on in my career (in 1988), I was 
involved in the large scale production of Bacillus globigii spores, which were used 
for bio-tracing and were routinely used to monitor water flows. The growth 
conditions and sporulation characteristics of B. globigii and B. anthracis are similar; 
they are both difficult to spore – sporulation agar is nearly completely dried out 
before sporulation starts to occurs, in some cases taking up to 6 weeks. The 
method I was involved in and modified involved the production of 100+ litres of B. 
globigii spores in a large fermenter with multiple feeds at set times, B. globigii is an 
ACDP hazard group 2 pathogen. A similar process was applied to production of     
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B. anthracis spores. This necessitated scale-down of the procedure so that it could 
be undertaken in a small fermenter for operation inside a Class III microbiological 
safety cabinet (MSC), in order to comply with the containment requirements of 
working with an ACD3 hazard group 3 pathogen and not to contravene the 
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC, 1972) by producing hundreds of litres of 
high titre spores. Using this alternative method of propagation, all spore stocks for 
the task orders were produced within three months and were of high titre and 
quality for use in subsequent studies.  Due to security issues around the nature of 
this work, this methodology was not published; however, the virulence of the 
resulting spore stock was presented as a poster at the 7th American Society of 
Microbiology, Biodefense and Emerging Diseases Research Meeting, Baltimore 
(Hatch et al., 2009). 
 
The robustness of the B. anthracis spore means that the decontamination of 
contaminated soil represents a particular challenge and we have reviewed the 
available strategies for environmental sampling and anthrax decontamination 
(Sharp & Roberts, 2006). This publication included various case studies of the 
decontamination of specific buildings following incidences of bioterrorism in the US, 
and the clinical case details of two cases of occupationally derived anthrax in the 
UK, which I had previously presented at the International Conference on Emerging 
Infectious Diseases in Atlanta, USA (Roberts et al., 2002). In addition to 
comprising a comprehensive review of the published literature in this field, this 
publication included my analysis of the thousands of samples that had been 
received by the B. anthracis reference laboratory, of which I had processed the 
samples between 1997 and 2006 as part of Environmental and Biosafety Services, 
and then latterly as the project team leader of the B. anthracis reference 
laboratory, contributing new information to the public domain on the numbers and 
nature of environmental samples that were being tested in the UK at this time. This 
publication thus provided a valuable resource for the academic, public health and 
biodefence communities, and has been widely cited since in B. anthracis studies 
since (see metrics section).  
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1.2.4. High Consequence Pox Viruses 
 
There are two species of pox virus that must be handled under high containment, 
monkeypox (ACDP3) and variola virus (ACDP4). This section describes my 
contribution to the characterisation of monkeypox infection animal models, and 
evaluation of the toxicity and protective efficacy of a third-generation smallpox 
vaccine. 
 
The variola virus is the causative agent of smallpox, a devastating disease 
characterised by distinctive skin lesions that has a fatality rate of up to 30%. 
Smallpox was declared eradicated by the WHO in 1980 following a global 
campaign, and following eradication it was recommended that all countries cease 
smallpox vaccination. Only a fraction of the world’s population now retains 
immunity from previous vaccination, leaving the remainder of the population 
susceptible to this disease (Henderson et al., 1999). Consequently, the risk of 
deliberate reintroduction of smallpox in a bioterrorism event, as well as the 
emergence of monkeypox, would have potentially devastating consequences and 
there is therefore a need for a safe, effective vaccine to protect against pox 
infections.    
 
In cases where studies in humans are not possible or are unethical, the US Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) permits the approval or licensing of a drug or 
vaccine on the basis of animal studies, if the animal model is an accurate, well-
characterised representation of the disease condition in humans (FDA, 2002): the 
so-called ‘Animal Rule’. This rule has been applied to studies testing the efficacy of 
smallpox vaccine, since working with variola virus is both unethical and impossible 
given the obvious risks of reintroducing an eradicated disease. There is 
consequently great demand for surrogate models of smallpox infection in humans. 
In addition to being a clinically relevant human virus in its own right, monkeypox 
virus presents with similar clinical symptoms to smallpox in humans and results in 
lethal systemic infection in primates. Tree et al., 2015 has contributed 
significantly to the characterisation of monkeypox virus infection of cynomolgus 
macaques as a smallpox model, building on previous evidence indicating its 
suitability for simulation of smallpox infections (Cann et al., 2013; Chapman et al., 
2010; Zaucha et al., 2001). A range of challenge routes have been studied in 
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cynomolgus macaques, including subcutaneous (Nagata et al., 2014; Saijo et al., 
2009), intravenous (Buchman et al., 2010; Earl et al., 2004; Earl et al., 2008; Hirao 
et al., 2011; Huggins et al., 2009; Johnson et al., 2011; Jordan et al., 2009), 
intrabronchial (Johnson et al., 2011) and intratracheal (Goff et al., 2011; Stittelaar 
et al., 2006; Stittelaar et al., 2005). The natural route of infection for smallpox in 
man is through close contact with an infected person via the oropharynx or 
nasopharynx (Fenner et al., 1998), and furthermore, deliberate release of either 
smallpox or monkeypox is considered likely to be by aerosol to permit rapid 
dispersion across a large area. Despite this, there was comparably limited data 
obtained using this infection route (Barnewall et al., 2012; Nalca et al., 2010; 
Zaucha et al., 2001) and the initial stages of monkeypox infection had not been 
previously investigated in detail. We therefore sought to characterise the early 
pathogenic events that occur during aerosolised infection of cynomolgus macaques 
(Tree et al., 2015), through clinical observations and the determination of 
associated viral loads, immune responses and pathological changes. 
 
The establishment of a reliable, reproducible macaque model of aerosolised 
monkeypox virus infection required a considerable investment in containment 
facilities at PHE Porton, and involved both the improvement of existing methods 
and the development of novel approaches for carrying out animal studies in high 
containment. Under my direction an entirely new building was designed solely for 
these studies, and included a new laminar flow system to permit handling of 
infected animals, specialist aerobiology equipment including plethysmography, and 
telemetric capability and advanced CCTV to enhance subject monitoring. Planning 
permission for this was granted by Wiltshire Council in 2006 (Application: 
S/2006/1259). A major limitation of animal studies using aerosolised routes of 
infection is that they often struggle to meet the accuracy and reproducibility 
obtained using other challenge routes. The new aerobiology equipment in this 
facility enabled us to deliver accurate doses for virus challenge and we were able 
to match the levels of accuracy seen with other routes of infection. 
  
The data we generated during this study supported and expanded on previous 
work using this infection model (Zaucha et al., 2001) and demonstrated similarities 
to the clinical presentation of smallpox in humans (Fenner et al., 1998). This work 
thus contributed to both our understanding of the progress of monkeypox infection 
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and to providing further characterisation of the smallpox animal model, thereby 
supporting its application in future smallpox intervention studies. Our study was 
reviewed by the US government and we were granted approval to use this animal 
model for studying human pox infections on the basis of the FDA Animal Rule. 
 
Some countries have stockpiled smallpox vaccine for use in event of a bioterrorist 
attack; in the UK, the stockpiled vaccine is the second-generation Lister vaccine, 
which is composed of live vaccinia virus. In certain individuals, this vaccine has 
serious or even life-threatening side-effects, and it has been estimated that in a 
public health emergency approximately a quarter of the population would be at risk 
of developing complications (Kemper, Davis, & Freed, 2002). Modified vaccinia 
Ankara (MVA) has been attenuated by hundreds of passages in cell culture and has 
subsequently lost the ability to replicate effectively in humans (Earl et al., 2004). 
Third-generation MVA vaccines have been shown to be comparatively safe with 
none of the complications of first- and second-generation smallpox vaccines, 
especially for patients with HIV or atopic dermatitis, which are contraindicated for 
the first and second-generation vaccines (Earl et al., 2004; Kennedy & Greenberg, 
2009; Mayr et al., 1978; Stickl et al., 1974).  
 
IMVAMUNE is a third-generation vaccine manufactured by Bavarian-Nordic 
(Martinsried, Germany) that is derived from a strain of MVA. It has been supported 
through to licensure by the US Government, the National Institute of Allergy and 
Infectious Diseases (NIAID) for animal studies and subsequently the Biomedical 
Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) clinical trials. My group 
has played an essential part in providing evidence supporting the licensure of 
IMVAMUNE (Hatch et al., 2013; Tree et al., 2016), using the aerosolised 
macaque monkeypox virus model described above (Tree et al., 2015). Hatch et 
al., 2013 describes a pivotal study assessing the protective efficacy of either one 
or two (prime-boost; administered 28 days apart) doses of IMVAMUNE against a 
subsequent aerosol monkeypox virus challenge, and evaluated its performance 
against the second-generation vaccine ACAM2000. We showed that the use of a 
prime-boost regime (but not a single dose) of IMVAMUNE provided complete 
protection from subsequent challenge with monkeypox, demonstrating stimulation 
of both neutralising antibody and cell-mediated immune responses. This 
IMVAMUNE prime-boost regimen is well-tolerated in human subjects, with the 
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second dose significantly boosting antibody responses (Frey et al., 2013), 
supporting our observation that two doses of vaccine were required for maximal 
efficacy.  
 
The administration of two doses of IMVAMUNE 28 days apart is the optimal dosing 
schedule for this vaccine; however, in event of a deliberate smallpox release, this 
dosing regimen would be not be effective at providing rapid protection of the 
population. To give maximum protection in an emergency situation, an accelerated 
vaccination schedule or, ideally, a single dose of vaccine would be desirable. Frey 
and colleagues evaluated the use of a compressed schedule of vaccination (two 
doses given, 7 days apart) and found this was not as effective at stimulating 
antibody responses in humans as when given 28 days apart (Frey et al., 2013). 
The same group evaluated the effects of administration of a single, high-dose (5 x 
108 TCID50, compared to the standard 1 x 108 dose) in a phase II clinical trial (Frey 
et al., 2014). Prior to this study being carried out, we conducted a good laboratory 
practice (GLP) toxicity study testing the effects of this high dose in New Zealand 
white rabbits to contribute to the safety assessment for the use of this vaccine 
regimen in humans (Tree et al., 2016). We established that a repeated high dose 
of vaccine was safe in this rabbit model and that this dose elicited no adverse 
events, supporting its use if required in an emergency situation. The high dose was 
subsequently shown to be well-tolerated in human subjects although the high dose 
gave inferior antibody responses relative to the standard dosing regimen (Frey et 
al., 2014).  
 
Our monkeypox and IMVAMUNE studies (Hatch et al., 2013; Tree et al., 2015; 
Tree et al., 2016) have provided crucial evidence supporting the IMVAMUNE 
licensure package submitted to the US FDA. Bavarian-Nordic is currently seeking 
approval for use of IMVAMUNE in the US and our studies are key to their FDA 
submission (personal communication, BARDA). These studies also have 
implications for protection of the human population against monkeypox, which has 
emerged in West and Central Africa since the cessation of mass smallpox 
vaccination (Durski et al., 2018; Hutin et al., 2001; Meyer et al., 2002; Rimoin et 
al., 2010). The first cases of monkeypox virus infection in the UK were very 
recently diagnosed, following two unrelated imported monkeypox cases from 
Nigeria (Vaughan et al., 2018). IMVAMUNE is available in the EU under the 
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tradename IMVANEX and has been used as part of the response in the UK and is 
indicated in the rapid risk assessment issued by the European Centre for Disease 
Prevention and Control on the 21st September 2018 (ECDC, 2018).  
 
The principles of the ‘3Rs’ (Replacement, Reduction and Refinement) were 
developed over 50 years ago and provide a framework for performing humane 
animal research: Replacement refers to methods which avoid or replace the use of 
animals in an area where animals would otherwise have been used, Reduction 
refers to any strategy that will result in fewer animals being used and Refinement 
refers to the modification of husbandry or experimental procedures to minimize 
pain and distress.  Since then the 3Rs have become embedded in national and 
international legislation and regulations on the use of animals in scientific 
procedures.  The application for a project licence to undertake the monkeypox 
studies (Hatch et al., 2013; Tree et al., 2015), in accordance with the Home 
Office Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986, undertook to refine and reduce the 
number of animals used.  We achieved refinement by way of using of implanted 
telemetric devices that could allow for the remote monitoring of the animals, more 
robust and accurate data with no manipulation of the animals and the provision of 
additional measurements that could be used as euthanasia criteria. We were able 
to reduce the number of animal subjects in our studies by using the latest 
aerobiology equipment linked to real time plethysmography, to reproduce aerosol 
dosing with accuracy not previously possible in these sorts of experiments; fewer 
animals were therefore needed to ensure the studies were robust. The licence had 
an animal allocation of that allowed for a number of repeat experiments but due to 
the robust aerobiology data and information obtained, no repeats were needed and 
the programme of work was completed with a significant reduction in subject 
numbers. We refined our procedures to employ the most up-to-date CCTV 
technology to permit monitoring of the animals without having to enter the room, 
thereby minimising animal disturbance and distress. The building, containment 
system, telemetry and all necessary equipment was funded by NIAID (NIAID, 
2003c). The technological and procedural advances introduced during the course of 
the IMVAMUNE and monkeypox studies have demonstrably and positively impacted 
the way animal containment studies are performed at PHE Porton in many ways: 
reproducibility of delivered aerosol doses has reduced the number of test animals 
required; telemetry and advanced CCTV have improved the quality of life of study 
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animals; and the use of veterinary blood analysers, a first for PHE, gave a greater 
wealth of data that was not previously possible. Together, these all fulfilled an 
obligation to reduce animal numbers and refine the studies, whilst capturing the 
maximum possible amount of data on the efficacy of interventions. Leading the 
team responsible for so many advancements in the way animal studies are carried 
out in containment and the consequent improvement in the welfare of animal 
subjects has been a particularly rewarding part of my career. 
 
1.3. Future Work 
 
PHE is committed to building a suited ACDP containment level 4 facility when it 
relocates its two scientific centres, Porton and Colindale, and its headquarters 
function to a new campus at Harlow on the former GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) New 
Frontiers Science Park (https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-
invests-350-million-to-create-world-class-public-health-labs-in-harlow).  Currently, 
the UK utilises cabinet lines for in-vitro work due to regulatory constraints but a tri-
partite group was set up with a view to amending the UK guidelines to allow for 
suited working systems at ACDP containment Level 4.  The new build facility at 
PHE Harlow will contain a new animal facility capable of handling animals up to 
ACDP and SAPO Containment Levels 4, along with a suited and cabinet line ACDP 
and SAPO Containment Level 4 in-vitro laboratories.  I was part of the tri-partite 
group that consisted of dstl, HSE and PHE which has rewritten the ACDP 
Containment Level 4 guidelines to include suited systems of work which are due to 
be issued in late 2018, early 2019.   
 
Additionally, I am the PHE Senior User on the Science Hub programme for the new 
high containment facility to be built in Harlow.  Transition to PHE Harlow is key for 
my department, I need to be able to maintain business as usual for a critical 
capability, ensure competent cohort of staff in the new facility and have available a 
cadre of cabinet line and suit trained individuals.  The training for suited systems 
takes many years and I have instigated a programme of training with the Public 
Health Agency of Canada to have staff trained at their National Microbiology 
Laboratory in Winnipeg. 
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Our vision for the new facility was presented at the WHO Consultative Meeting on 
High/Maximum Containment (Biosafety Level 4) Laboratories Networking at the 
International Agency for Research on Cancer, Lyon, France 13-15 December 2017 
were I was invited to present for the UK on the proposed new facility at Harlow 
and separately on engineering challenges faced when running high containment 
facilities (Proceedings of meeting to be published on the WHO website in due 
course. Draft issued). None of this would have been possible without the expertise 
and knowledge I have gained working with the challenges around handling high 
consequence pathogens. 
 
1.4. Concluding Comments 
 
This thesis has brought together my published papers, which involve working with 
a range of pathogens from ACDP hazard group 3 and 4. These are the culmination 
of differing strategies to allow the handling of high consequence pathogens for 
culture, detection, testing of interventions, and inactivation to release them from 
the restrictions of containment work. This has allowed significant advances in being 
able to work, understand, detect and treat infections with these pathogens.  
 
The papers follow a career that has grown into the leadership of research, clinical 
and service delivery working with the most dangerous pathogens known to man, at 
both the national and international level. The strategies employed have been 
instrumental in the approval of a new vaccine for smallpox, an understanding of 
anthrax background levels and decontamination, looking at bacteriophage as a 
detection strategy and potential therapeutic, understanding of vaccine processes 
and helping the advancement of modern molecular techniques by allowing samples 
to be removed from containment while maintaining the integrity of molecular 
material. 
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